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In 1943, Angelo Piero Sereni wrote The Italian Conception of International Law, a
book explicitly aimed at restoring Anglo–American respect for Italian interna-
tional lawyers after the Fascist period. On the seventieth anniversary of the pub-
lication of this work, it is worth considering whether there is, in fact, such a thing
as an `Italian' conception of international law. Methodologically speaking, does
thinking of international law in terms of national schools make sense? Although a
comparative approach to international law is back in vogue, this article questions
the validity of any attempt at finding any `Italian distinctiveness' in the intellectual
history of the Italian school(s) of international law. Sereni's enlisting of ancient
masters to an `Italian' conception between the 13th and 18th centuries is for the
most part untenable. While a distinctively Italian conception of international law
arguably came into existence in the 19th century with Mancini's theory of nation-
alities, Anzilotti successfully set out to dissolve this into the 20th century European
mainstream of positivist international law. The ensuing absence of an `Italian' con-
ception may give pause for thought to contemporary proponents of `comparative
international law'.
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1 Introduction
A `comparative' approach to international law is back in vogue these days,
slowly re-emerging from the near-fatal blow dealt to it by the demise of `Soviet
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international law'.1 Many authors are once again investigating the impact of
national legal traditions in the construction of international law, but Italy has so
far been rather neglected.2 For instance, consider Martti Koskenniemi's recent
claim that `international law is a ``German discipline'' in a way that it cannot be
said to be ``French'', ``British'' or indeed an ``American'' discipline'.3 He did not
even mention the Italian school in his analysis, let alone include it as one of the
possible alternatives to the pervasive German influence. True, he affirmed that
international law is, in the eyes of many, a sort of `European political vocabulary'.4
But this was a rather truncated Europe, as far away from the Mediterranean Sea
asMitteleuropa and the Danube can be. Italy was also conspicuously absent from
the recent Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, with the exception
of a few pages on theOxonian scholar AlbericoGentili and a handful of references
to other authors.5
At the other end of the spectrum, Angelo Piero Sereni claimed in his 1943
book, The Italian Conception of International Law, that modern international law
was essentially Italian. The complex relations between the independent or semi-
independent comuni during the Renaissance period were, in his view, a spring-
board for future European-wide transformationswhich created international law
as we know it today.6 Also, he argued, it was Gentili, not Grotius, the `realistic
and passionate' man who employed `juridical precision' to solve the `urgent prob-
lems of his times', unencumbered by the `tedious … abuse of quotations' which
is found in Grotius;7 and while it was silly to argue over who the real `father' of
1
On the term `comparative international law' and its Cold War legacy, see B N Mamlyuk & U
Mattei, `Comparative International Law', (2011) 36 Brook J Int'l L 385; W E Butler, `Comparative
approaches to international law', (1985) 190 RdC 9. For a contemporary (and far more doctrinal)
understanding, see A Roberts, `Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in
International Law', (2011) 60(1) ICLQ 57.
2
Except by Italian scholars themselves: see e.g. F Salerno, `La Rivista e gli studi di diritto
internazionale nel periodo 1906-1943', (2007) 90(2) Riv Dir Int 305; P Ziccardi, `Evoluzione
e traguardi della scuola italiana di Diritto internazionale nel XX secolo', in F M Mariño
Menéndez (ed) El Derecho internacional en los albores del siglo XXI: homenaje al profesor Juan Manuel
Castro-Rial Canosa (2002) 715; E Cannizzaro, `La doctrine italienne et le développement du droit
international dans l'après-Guerre: entre continuité et discontinuité', (2004) 50 AFDI 1.
3
M Koskenniemi, `Between Coordination and Constitution: International Law as a German





B Fassbender & A Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (2012). In
contrast, the book contains contributions by Italian scholars.
6
A P Sereni, The Italian Conception of International Law (1943), 118-22.
7
Ibid, 116.
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international law was, or indeed to dwell on Gentili's superiority or older age, the
two authors could certainly be deemed equal. They were the product of the same
`epoch, theories and historical problems'.8
My intention here is not to defend the Italian school of international law
from unwarranted obliteration at the hands of Northern European scholars. As
we shall see, international legal academia is alive and well in Italy—its scholarly
production needs no advocates, only keen readers. My aim is rather to critically
revisit Sereni's book seventy years after its publication.
Can we really identify an `Italian' conception of international law? And even
if such `Italian' conception existed, would it be radically different from, say, the
`German', `French' or `British' conceptions? After all, legal historians such as
Paolo Grossi would probably argue that all of these national schools, in fact,
belong to the same European legal order, their differences merely variants of the
same `modern legalmyths' feeding legal positivism.9 The broadermethodological
question underlying this article is whether attempts to separate schools of
international law according to nationality really advance our understanding of
the discipline. Can the influence of different legal traditions in international law
really be fruitfully understood in terms of `comparative international law'?
2 An `Italian school' obviously exists
In the broadest sense of the word `school' (a group of academics engaged in
the study of a certain area of human knowledge), there is no doubt that an
Italian school of international law exists. A relatively high number of Italians
have always featured prominently in the relevant professional circles. We can
count five Italian judges at the World Court (Anzilotti at the Permanent Court
of International Justice, which he also presided; Morelli, Ago, Ferrari Bravo
and Gaja at the International Court of Justice); one judge at the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Treves); one member of the Appellate Body
of the World Trade Organisation (Sacerdoti); three judges at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Cassese, who also presided it,
Pocar, Lattanzi as judge ad litem); one judge ad litem at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (Lattanzi); two judges at the International Criminal Court
(Politi and the current Vice President, Tarfusser); many counsel appearing before
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2012); and of course a constant (if automatic) presence at the European Court
of Human Rights (including Balladore Pallieri, who presided it in the 1970s) and
at the European Court of Justice.
Moreover, an Italian was the first President of the Institut de droit international,
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini. As we shall see, he was a Risorgimento man
with eclectic interests spanning from poetry to politics, although he did not
disdain some old-fashioned nepotism, having sponsored his son-in-law Augusto
Pierantoni to join the Institut at its foundation in 1873. Since then, Italians
have always been conspicuously present at the Institut (the current list of
Italian members amounts to about a dozen). For its part, the UN-established
International Law Commission has had four Italian members since 1957 (Ago,
Arangio-Ruiz, Ferrari Bravo and Gaja).
Italian scholars have featured even more prominently at the Hague Academy
of International Law. The Academy's summer courses started in 1923 and have
since been an excellent indicator of who constitutes the `Invisible College' of
international lawyers.10 Of the 1300 published courses given at the Academy since
its opening, around 10 per cent were given by 81 Italian scholars. In total, 69 out
of the 83 summer sessions held so far have had at least one Italian scholar as a
teacher. Furthermore, Italians gave 10 of the Academy's `general courses' in public
international law (Cavaglieri in 1929, Salvioli in 1933, Morelli in 1956, Quadri in
1964, Ago in 1974,Monaco in 1968, Conforti in 1988, Capotorti in 1994, Condorelli
in 2010, Gaja in 2011) and four of the `general courses' in private international law
(Ago in 1936, Vitta in 1979, Pocar in 1993, Picone in 1999). These are regarded
as important signs of international recognition in the field of international law.
Interestingly, at the Academy, Italians taught mainly in French (114 out of 130
courses). In fact, Italians taught only in French until 1959, when Sereni was the
first Italian to give a course in English.
Quite tellingly, of the prominent Italian international lawyers considered
above, only three are women: Judge Lattanzi; Loretta Malintoppi, a counsel
who appeared before the International Court of Justice; and Boschiero, the
only woman, among the 81 Italians, who has taught at the Hague Academy
of International Law. These numbers do not quite reflect the important
contribution of many other female Italian scholars to international law; rather,
they confirm the existence of wider diversity issues at the top of the profession,
both in Italian academia and in international law more generally.11
10
For the term `Invisible college', see O Schachter, `The Invisible College of International Lawyers',
(1977-1978) 72 Nw U L Rev 217.
11
See e.g. the important empirical study conducted by C Rose & S Kumar, `Diversity and the Field
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According to the latest figures,12 there are at least 268 scholars in public
and private international law employed by Italian universities, plus at least
70 academics specialising in European Union law.13 The reasons for these
high numbers are structural. As many as 71 Italian universities currently
conduct teaching and research in law.14 Of these, the vast majority are state
universities, whose law schools usually have no entry selection, and as such,
student numbers are very high compared to more selective higher education
systems. Because the study of international law is compulsory for most students
undertaking a law degree, and because of additional international law teaching
needs at other faculties (political science, economics), many universities employ
more than one chair in international law and a few associate professors and
researchers. Furthermore, a number of prominent law review journals and
yearbooks are based in Italy, such as the Rivista di diritto internazionale (established
in 1906); La Comunità Internazionale; the Comunicazioni e Studi dell'Istituto di
Diritto Internazionale e Straniero della Università di Milano; the Rivista di diritto
internazionale privato e processuale (focusing on private international law); and
the Italian Yearbook of International Law, catering for an international audience.
The Journal of International Criminal Justice was founded by Cassese and is still
managed by an Italian scholar, while the European Journal of International Law
has consistently had a number Italian editors and contributors. Italians regularly
publish articles in other English and French language journals. But is their work
any good? During the latest Research Quality Assessment conducted nationally
(VQR 2004-2010), fellow academics anonymously reviewed selected writings
by international lawyers based at Italian universities and found that 57.1 per
cent of the reviewed outputs were either `good' or `excellent', 21.6 per cent were
`acceptable', and 21.3 per cent were of `limited' value or worse. Although not
outstanding, these figures were better than the national average for law subjects,
perhaps confirming the suspicion that Italians are rather harsh markers.15
of Public International Law: A Study of theNationality andGender of Counsel Appearing Before
the ICJ', working paper presented at the European Society of International Law research forum,
Amsterdam, 24 May 2013, on file with author.
12
See Agenzia Nazionale di Valutazione del sistema Universitario e della Ricerca, `Valutazione
della Qualità della Ricerca 2004-2010 (VQR 2004-2010)', Rapporto Finale, 30 June 2013,
<http://www.anvur.org/rapporto/> [accessed 23 July 2013].
13
The increase in the last 30 years has been quitemarked: AntonioCassese had counted 131 scholars
in the late 1980s: A Cassese, `Capitolo terzo - diritto internazionale', in L Bonanate (ed) Studi
internazionali (1990) 113, 115-6.
14




In sum, international law scholarship is alive and well in Italy, as testified
inter alia by the activities of the Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale, the learned
society of the profession. But can we identify a distinctively `Italian' conception
of international law in this multifarious production?
3 An `Italian conception' may not exist
3.1 Renaissance Italy as a laboratory of international legal
practice
While any attempt to appropriate the heritage of the whole Roman Empire on
behalf of Italy would, in fact, be ludicrous, it must be conceded that `Italy' was
born well before the Italian state was established in 1861. An intellectual history of
`Italian' international legal thinking would thus need to start somewhere near the
creation of an `Italian' language and culture (as opposed to a `Latin' one)—perhaps
in the late 13th century, when Sicilian poets at the court of Frederick II influenced
Tuscan writers such as Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio in laying the literary
foundations of Italian culture, sonnet by sonnet, unrequited love by unrequited
love. Dante was also—some would say chiefly—a political writer, and his De
Monarchia can indeed be explored in search of insights on the organisation of
a world legal order.16 Obviously, one would need to consider the international
dimension of later developments in the history of Italian political thought, such
as Machiavelli's Principe.17 In Sereni's view, however, these were not legal
writers. Sereni's history of Italian international legal doctrine begins with the
14th century's jurist par excellence, Bartolus of Sassoferrato.18
In enlisting Bartolus to public international law, Sereni is forced to stretch
reality slightly. Possibly the most noteworthy commentator of the Corpus Iuris
Civilis, Bartolus is known to international lawyers for his treatise on reprisals19
and for what is often considered the first work on private international law.20
So far, so good. However, Sereni tries to persuade his readers that Bartolus
was also a public international law theorist, because of his work concerning the
16
Hans Kelsen's first book was on Dante: H Kelsen, Die Staatslehre des Dante Alighieri (1905).
See also M Koskenniemi, ```International community'' from Dante to Vattel', in V Chetail & P
Haggenmacher (eds), Vattel's International Law in a XXIst Century Perspective (2011) 51, 54-6.
17
Koskenniemi, above n 16, 56-7.
18
Sereni, above n 6, 58.
19
Bartolus of Sassoferrato, Tractatus represaliarum (1354).
20
See J H Beale (ed), Bartolus on the Conflict of Laws (1914).
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relationship between Italian cities. In Sereni's view, the semi-independent cities
of Italian Renaissance were precursors of modern states, because the concept of
superiorem non recognoscentes, at the basis of a modern conception of sovereignty,
was conceived of at the time.
The last remaining vestiges of the Holy Roman Empire could be equated to
today's international community—a system of coordination of sovereign entities,
rather than a superior authority.21 Sereni even affirms, in no uncertain terms,
that `the modern international society is but the same empire transformed and
amplified'22 and that `the international community of today is … the ancient
civitas Christiana, which united all the peoples of Europe in one organism under
the supreme authority of the emperor and the pope'.23 The civitas was gone, but
the international community remained. In this regard, Sereni quoted approvingly
from Giorgio Balladore Pallieri (1905-1980), according to whom the end of
`imperial and papal authority' had not destroyed `the general juridical order that
centered in these powers'.24 The rules concerning the relationships between
subjects of the empire were still in existence, because `even after claiming and
obtaining their internal and external independence', the newly created states
`continued to cultivate among one another relations still based on the same
rules as existed when the pope and the emperor were authorities superordinated
over the other powers'.25 Westphalia was not a moment of creation of a new
legal order, but rather one in which `the legal order of the ancient Holy Roman
Empire' was `limited in its jurisdiction solely to international matters because of
the formation of modern states', and transformed to cater for the reluctance of
modern states `to admit in any field whatsoever a power superior to them'.26
Of course, it is theoretically possible to conceive of all struggles of contem-
porary international lawyers as footnotes on the historical arc created by the end
of the empire.27 During the Renaissance, says Sereni, the Holy Roman Empire,
still technically sovereign over Italian cities, but in fact more and more devoid of
power, was fetishized by writers as `a messianic dream, an ideal aspiration' which
had little to do with reality.28 As a divertissement, these words should perhaps
21






G Balladore Pallieri, `Le dottrine di Hans Kelsen e il problema dei rapporti tra diritto interno e
diritto internazionale', (1935) 27 Riv Dir Int 24, 68 (Sereni's translation).
25




See e.g. W G Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (English edn, 2000), 51-60 and 141-62.
28
Sereni, above n 6, 60.
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inspire caution in keen cosmopolitan technocrats of today, who are also fetishiz-
ing the `international community' as a unifying aspiration while they are busy
managing the daily relations between international actors. But from a historio-
graphical point of view, Sereni's approach is both flawed and drearily Eurocen-
tric. First, there is an obvious risk of juxtaposing entirely different situations by
imposing present concepts to a distorted view of the past. Second, even tak-
ing Sereni's approach seriously, the most interesting aspect of Bartolus' work,
at least for our purposes, would not be the one concerning the internal dealings
within the Empire, but the one concerning the relationship between the Holy Ro-
man Empire and other peoples, classified by Bartolus as the Christian allies (`the
Greeks'), the non-Christian friends (`the Tartars'), the permanent enemies (`the
Turks'), and those (`the Indians') with whom `non habemus pacem nec guerram, nec
aliquid facere'.29 Did Bartolus provide us with a specifically `Italian' conception
of dealing with them? Not really—his Roman law approach and his Latin prose
were the European standard for the time, and Sereni's passionate defence thereof
(comparing Bartolus to artists such as Michelangelo, Mantegna and Bramante)
somewhat misses the mark. Sereni is forced to admit that `it was only later that
international law acquired distinct content and autonomous characteristics of its
own'.30 That is precisely the point.
Sereni is much more persuasive in his description of Renaissance Italy as a
laboratory of international practice. Between the late 13th and the 16th centuries,
the Italian states were at the centre of a very advanced and complex web of com-
merce, art and enterprise. Their relations with each other and with overseas
countries, as well as the methods through which they settled international dis-
putes, often amounted to the first legal scaffolding of contemporary `international
law'.31 Indeed, Sereni is correct in pointing out that `some international institu-
tions that still exist, such as legations, consulates, extradition, and international
settlements, are related to institutions which originated or at least reached their
full development in Renaissance Italy'.32 But this is not a contribution in terms of
an Italian `conception' of international law, rather the building blocks of crucial
aspects of the whole of international law.
Furthermore, modern international law still had to be born as a discipline.
Fertile ground was to be found in `proud Protestant sixteenth-century England,
29







Is There an Italian Conception of International Law? 887
freed from all subordination to the emperor and the pope',33 where Alberico
Gentili (1552-1608), an Italian Protestant persecuted by the Inquisition, found
refuge. Gentili became the first Italian lawyer tenured at Oxbridge, and a very
successful practitioner advising the English government as well as the Spanish
embassy on matters of international law. But, leaving aside all issues concerning
the relationship between Gentili and Grotius, the question here is whether we
can really appropriate Gentili on behalf of an `Italian' conception of international
law. Given that he wrote in Oxford and that his books were in Latin, a nationalist
appropriation of his work would be as wrong on behalf of Italy as it would on
behalf of the United Kingdom. Gentili is certainly one of the main starting points
of the construction of the European language of international law—not British
doctrine, nor an Italian conception.34
Nor can we find a better candidate for Italian appropriation in Pierino
Belli from Alba (1502-1575), whose De re militari et bello tractatus (A treatise on
military matters and warfare)
35 was somewhat ahead of his time, especially in
light of certain `humanitarian' considerations contained therein.36 As Cavaglieri
remarked, Belli was held in contempt by Gentili, who went very close to
plagiarising Belli's work without even acknowledging his existence.37 Sereni
praises Belli's `breadth of ideas [that were] truly exceptional for his times' and
his `lofty' idealism.38 For Sereni, Belli was `the last great writer of the Italian
theologico-religious tradition'—that is, a natural lawyer.39 A Catholic writer
quite at ease with the Spanish theological school of Vitoria and Suarez, Belli had
long served in the Spanish military. Once again, assigning him exclusively to an
`Italian tradition' would be rather preposterous. As a natural lawyer, he was one
of the earliest representatives of a certain mode of international legal thinking
which was later to be eradicated by legal positivists. But before the `magnificent
and progressive fate' of positivism could take hold, Risorgimentohad to occur, with




For a recent assessment of his legacy, see B Kingsbury & B Straumann (eds), The Roman
Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (2010).
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Pierino Belli of Alba, De re militari et bello tractatus (1563), vol I (photostatic reproduction, 1936).
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See R Comba & G S Pene Vidari (eds), Un giurista tra principi e sovrani: Pietrino Belli a 500 anni
dalla nascita (atti del convegno di studi, Alba, 30 novembre 2002) (2004).
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A Cavaglieri, `Introduction', in Pierino Belli of Alba, De re militari et bello tractatus (1563), vol II
(1936 translation), 11a-28a.
38




3.2 The Risorgimento and the theory of nationalities
Sereni charitably jumps, in the space of a few pages, from the 16th to the 19th
century. This period of `decline of international law in Italy' coincided with the
long decline of the small Italian Renaissance states faced with the military and
economic competition of the ascending European monarchies. In that period,
Italy became little more than a crucial battleground in Europe's eternal pursuit of
a balance of power, and Italian international lawyers had very little to contribute
compared to their non-Italian colleagues such as Zouche, Pufendorf, Wolff, Vattel
or G F de Martens.40
The situation radically changed in the 19th century. At the foundation of
the Institut de droit international in 1873, Italian theories were very well known in
European circles. Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (1817-1888) was the first president
of the Institut and a prominent politician of the new Kingdom of Italy, of
which he was the Foreign Minister between 1881 and 1885.41 His theory of
nationalities, which he first formulated in the 1850s, gave an international legal
dimension to Giuseppe Mazzini's political project of Italian liberation from
foreign domination. A refugee from theKingdom of the Two Sicilies to Piedmont,
Mancini developed his theory along certain basic premises which well reflected
the spirit of the times.
Echoing the earlier Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744),
Mancini held that nations were the basic units of human organisation.42 Not
only did he argue that every nation `should constitute one state and one alone', he
further argued that a nation should be `left free to organise itself as an independent
state' according to the `principle of the self-determination of the peoples'; that
nations should be equal, and so should the states deriving therefrom; that
arbitration should be compulsory; and that a legal order capable of settling
disputes among nations should be established. Finally, Mancini stated that the
pope should not be a territorial sovereign.43 These principles were further
developed by a number of Italian international lawyers, such as TerenzioMamiani




OnMancini in general, see E Jayme, Pasquale StanislaoMancini: internationales Privatrecht zwischen
Risorgimento und praktischer Jurisprudenz (1980); C Storti, `Mancini, Pasquale Stanislao', in I
Birocchi et al (eds), Dizionario biografico dei giuristi italiani (XII - XX secolo) (2013) 1244.
42
See generally his 1851 opening lecture at the University of Turin: P S Mancini, `Della nazionalità
come fondamento del diritto delle genti', in A Pierantoni (ed) Diritto internationale: prelezioni
(1873) 1.
43
Sereni, above n 6, 163-4.
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made him very well known outside Italy.44
The political nature of the nationalities doctrine determined both its fortune
and its fate. `Nation' is a most elusive concept—and a dangerous one at that. One
of the purposes of Sereni's 1943 book was to disentangle the Italian doctrine of
nationalities from the Italian racist laws of 1938 and from the `absurd German
theories' which Fascist Italy adopted because of its `spirit of servility towards
Germany'.45 Indeed, the declared aim of Sereni's book was to persuade his
Anglo–American audience that Fascism and Nazism had no influence on the
Italian conception of international law.46 And yet, it is worth going back to
Mancini's opening lecture at the University of Turin, in 1851, when he first
expounded his theory of nationalities. The following passage on race, ignored by
Sereni, indisputably contains the very Italian seeds of those `German' absurdities:
Race, which expresses an identity of origin and blood, is another
important constitutive element of the Nation. Precisely in this
relationship the Nation takes from the Family. After Linnaeus'
initiative, man's natural history became the subject of insightful
studies, thanks to which anthropology can now declare to have
gained this truth, that among men there is an evident plurality
of races with more or less distinct characters, the furthest apart
being the white and the [black], without them going outside the
limits of natural varieties of an original and unique species. Where
more than one race co-habited or violently juxtaposed on the
same territory, there was no establishment of one Nationality, nor
there could be if not after a slow fusion of the ones with the
others, the mutual absorption of reciprocal qualities, and thus the
formation of a new composite race. […When considering ancient
descriptions of racial characteristics of European peoples…], we are
forced to believe in the durable persistence of certain transmissible
characteristics of race, which must certainly affect the national
spirit. It is this self-substratum, this foundation of physical and
moral characteristics that are in common with one's brothers, that
men usually love of the race they were born into: and it is this
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tie between individuals of the same stock in comparison to those
who are alien therefrom.47
Despite these odious words, Mancini does not equate nationality and race, as Nazi
theories would later do. A theory of nationality could exist even independently
of racial considerations.48 Mancini's conception is shaped by multiple `factors
of nationality', such as history, customs, laws, religion, territory and language,
with race being only one of these. For Mancini, a `consciousness of nationality'
is the essential element binding all of these factors together, so that a nation
is, ultimately, what an organised people believe it is.49 But this slightly more
nuanced approach did not impede the later ideological use of the idea of
`nation' as a tool in the intellectual arsenal of abhorrent supremacist doctrines.
Furthermore, from the point of view of the doctrine of international law, the
theory of nationalities was actually unworkable as the organisational criterion
of a world community dominated by states, some of which were (and still are)
pluri-national.50 Stating that nations and states must coincide would obviously
lead to a constant state of war. But there is also a positive aspect to the theory
of nationality. Its most important legacy is the subsequent development of the
principle of self-determination of peoples, which would find its zenith after the
Second World War.51
At the outset, the theory of nationalities had been very successful because
of its resonance with the project of national unification.52 It was only natural,
as Sereni remarks, that it would all but disappear once the Italian state came of
age.53 In this regard, a somewhat ironic twist ensued. Mancini, the architect
47
Mancini, above n 42, 31-3.
48
For a criticism of the German mythology of race from the point of view of another theory of
nationalities, see A Messineo, `Gli elementi costitutivi della nazione e la razza', (1938) 89 III-2115
Civiltà Cattolica 209, one of the isolated examples of strong official criticism by the Catholic
church at the time of the adoption of racial laws by Fascist Italy.
49
Sereni, above n 6, 162.
50
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the current Constitution of Bolivia, entered into force
in 2009, defines the state of Bolivia as a `Pluri-national' entity.
51
For a detailed assessment of the Italian theory of nationalities (also) in this light see L Nuzzo,
Origini di una scienza: diritto internazionale e colonialismo nel XIX secolo (2012), 87-168; on the link
between the theory of nationalities and self-determination, see also A Cobban, The Nation State
and National Self-Determination (rev. edn, 1969).
52
For a complete history of the Italian school of nationalities, see E Catellani, `Lesmaîtres de l'École
italienne du droit international au XIXe siècle', (1934) 46 RdC 705.
53
Sereni, above n 6, 174 (the doctrine `wore itself out toward the end of the century when the
Risorgimento was well-nigh accomplished').
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of the principle of self-determination, concluded his career as Foreign Minister
of the Kingdom of Italy, presiding over the first colonial efforts of the newly
constituted nation.54 He was thus forced to defend himself in Parliament against
those accusing him of clearly contradicting his professed views on the right of
peoples to be free.55 A shrewd politician, Mancini had realised that times had
changed, and his protestations of coherence appeared rather unpersuasive.56 His
incongruous turn to colonialism perfectly symbolises the Italian transformation
from a people needing liberation from Austro-Hungarians, Bourbons and popes
to the European Great Power, eager to share in the booty of a renewed `civilizing
mission'.
As far as international law was concerned, Guido Fusinato's (1860-1913)
eventual admission that states, not nations, were the formal subjects of the
international legal order was the final attempt of the Italian school of nationalities
to reconcile with international practice.57 By then, natural law was soon to
definitely give way to legal positivism, whose cloak of ostensible neutrality was
much better suited to the new foreign policy of the Italian Kingdom.
3.3 Anzilotti's eternal dominance
3.3.1 Fifty shades of black
From the early 20th century onwards, international legal scholarship in Italy
could be described as a battleground between various shades of legal positivism.
No neo-natural lawyer, no realist apologist of power, no Marxist, no post-
structuralist, feminist or critical legal scholar has come to dominate the intellec-
tual arena of Italian international law. If the `Italian school' had to be reduced to
one person to whom almost every prominent scholar was intellectually indebted,
this person would undoubtedly be Dionisio Anzilotti (1867-1950).58 Although the
debate has, at times, strayed from his strictest positions, especially in the case of
the followers of Santi Romano (1875-1947) and Balladore Pallieri (1905-1980), the
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mainstream of Italian international legal academia never abandoned the linguistic
perimeter of `black letter' law which Anzilotti defined at the beginning of the last
century.59 There are, of course, exceptions, such as Gabriele Salvioli's (1891-1979)
Catholic natural law approach orMarioGiuliano's (1914-1988)Marxist outlook,60
but these are so sparse as to confirm the general trend.
Obviously, stating that the Italian school is both `positivist' and `dualist' on
account of its founder may well be true and not leave us any wiser. As Gaja
remarked in 1992, `many possible meanings may be attached to the view that
an international lawyer is a positivist and a dualist'.61 Rather than accounting
for all the possible variants of positivism or mapping the many sub-schools in
which the Italian school is in fact articulated,62 the purpose of this section is to
consider two general points. First, canwe identify some unifying factors in Italian
international legal scholarship since Anzilotti? Second, do these factors make the
Italian school in any way distinctive or separate from the classic `black letter' side
of the European legal tradition?
3.3.2 The creation of the modern Italian school
Many have remarked that Georg Jellinek (1851-1911) colourfully chastised late 19th
century international lawyers for being the last indulgers in the `orgies' of natural
law in an age of widespread codification of private and criminal law.63 Dionisio
Anzilotti took it upon himself to rescue the Italian school of international law
both from the politicised endeavours of Mancini and from the naturalism of
Fiore.64 Crucially, Anzilotti's project was also directed at rejecting Hegelian and
Austinian conceptions, negating any possibility of law among states because of the
lack of a conceivable authority superior to them.65 In this regard (and perhaps in
59
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this regard only), we could put him in the same camp as the much more idealistic
Hersch Lauterpacht (1897-1960).66
Anzilotti's project was perfectly in line with the evolution of the study of law
in Italian universities at the time, under the combined influence of German and
French doctrines.67 As Sereni put it, it was necessary to establish once and for
all that `the Italian science of law [was] separate from politics, religion, morals
and the wishful thinking of well-meaning professors.'68 This science had, as
its object of study, the lex lata, which was composed of the legal rules which
are actually observed by the states in their relations, organised into a system
of `basic principles' derived from those rules.69 Gaja has closely analysed how
Anzilotti's thinking evolved over the years with respect to basic questions such
as the nature of the international legal system (his was a voluntarist approach,
including the notion of customary international law as a form of tacit agreement)
and the relationship between domestic and international law, often considered a
model of dualism.70 The latter was to become one of the most enduring legacies
of his theory within the Italian school.71
However, the crucial point is that Anzilotti imported to Italy the teachings
of Heinrich Triepel (1868-1946) and other German public law theorists.72 While
recent studies have underlined that this process of translation was heavily
influenced by Italian juridical culture,73 it is particularly telling that such a
mediation occurred through the theories of Santi Romano,74 who had in turn
been deeply influenced by French `institutional' theorists, Maurice Hauriou
66
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(1856-1929) in particular.75 These fertile debates between French and German
theories were the building blocks of Italian juridical science in the 20th century.76
A successful fusion of French and German theories was expressed by Tomaso
Perassi (1886-1960), whose theory of sources influenced Anzilotti himself, as well
as the Italian school more generally.77 For Sereni, it was important to underline
that the reaction to Anzilotti's theories by Romano, Balladore Pallieri and Perassi
had not in fact challenged the two fundamental objectives that Anzilotti had set
out to achieve, namely to eradicate natural law and to affirm international law
against realist apologists of power. Although fundamental to understanding how
positivism evolved in Italy, the conflict between Anzilotti's and Romano's theories
was `actually one of degree rather than substance', because each of these authors
`accept[ed] the positivist method'.78
And so did the other great masters born at the outset of the 20th century.
Among the most prominent successors of Anzilotti and Perassi in the Rome La
Sapienza chair of international law, GaetanoMorelli (1900-1989) came to embody
the Kelsenian and norm-oriented side of the positivist Italian school.79 The first
Italian judge at the International Court of Justice (from 1961 to 1970), he devoted
his academic career to issues of international procedure spanning across public
and private international law.80 In this regard, it is worth mentioning that one
of the many explaining factors of the Italian school's norm-oriented approach
is that the teaching and research in private and public international law were
joined in one single chair of `international law', so that the two disciplines greatly
influenced each other. International law was taught as an advanced technical
subject involving the rigorous exegesis of text.
After Morelli, the next Italian to become a judge at International Court of
Justice was Roberto Ago (1907-1995), to whose contribution we shall presently
turn. From the same generation, Rolando Quadri (1907-1976) had a great
influence in Italian legal academia spanning across both private and public
international law.81 His `monist' interpretation of Article 10(1) of the Italian
75
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Constitution, to the effect that both treaties and customary international law
would prevail over constitutional provisions by virtue of the pacta sunt servanda
rule, was one of the very few departures from Anzilottian dualism in the Italian
school.82 However, his overall construction remained a positivist one, albeit with
a `realistic' emphasis on international practice,83 which was later to be further
developed by Paolo Picone (b. 1940). But it is now time to turn to Roberto Ago,
the perfect example of how Anzilotti's successful doctrinal project brought the
Italian school into the European positivist mainstream.
3.3.3 An example: attribution of internationally wrongful conduct
in Ago
One of the defining features of Anzilotti's construction was an emphasis on
rules on responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. A true legal system
based on positive law must provide for certain consequences when rules are
violated. It is, therefore, not accidental that responsibility became one of the
areas in which the contribution of the Italian school has been most enduring
throughout time, especially at the International Law Commission—thanks to the
Special Rapporteurs Roberto Ago, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (b. 1919), and Giorgio
Gaja (b. 1939).84 It is useful to consider whether this contribution, although
certainly fundamental, can in fact be disentangled from its broader international
context—and consequently whether it can be deemed `Italian' in any meaningful
way. I will use the example of Ago's proposals on the attribution of internationally
wrongful conduct to states, which is just one small sub-set of the many issues
concerning responsibility.85
As Ago put it in 1971, states only act through human beings, because `the
State, as a legal person, is not physically capable of conduct'.86 The same is
true of international organisations and other collective entities. It follows that
82
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international law must be able to determine when a certain conduct can be
attributed to a state, especially in the context of assigning responsibility for the
breach of international obligations. The concept of attribution of conduct is a
relatively recent one in the history of international law. The main reason for this
is that international responsibility itself emerged quite late as a discrete subject
of study. In his 1923 lectures on state responsibility at the Hague Academy of
International Law, De Visscher started out by observing that it was not until
Triepel and `especially' Anzilotti's works, of about twenty years earlier, that state
responsibility had started acquiring a theoretical framework.87 And it was not
until shortly after De Visscher's lectures that Eagleton published his seminal
monograph on the topic.88 In fact, Grotius and his Italian precursors Pierino
Belli and Alberico Gentili had considered in passing the complex question of
the responsibility of a sovereign for the wrongs of its citizens and vice versa.89
And some initial ideas on the consequences of pacta sunt servanda had been
considered by Zouche, Pufendorf, Van Bynkershoek and Wolff in the 17th and
18th centuries.90 Furthermore, in his famous 19th century work, Calvo addressed
at some length the question of the responsibility of the government for the
acts of its agents.91 Nonetheless, it was only in the 20th century—with Triepel,
Anzilotti, De Visscher, Eagleton and the 1928 Factory at Chorzów case before
the Permanent Court of International Justice (to which Anzilotti clearly gave a
significant contribution)92—that international responsibility started its evolution
from being at the margins of international legal discourse into being (one of) `the
best proof[s] of [the] existence and themost crediblemeasure of [the] effectiveness'
of international law, in line with Anzilotti's project.93
In the course of this evolution, the idea of `imputability' or `attribution' of
acts and omissions to states always featured prominently. Anzilotti conceived
87
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what has become the classic account of attribution, according towhich attributing
a certain conduct to a state or an international organisation does not imply an
assessment of the causes of a certain act, nor of the `culpability' or `intentions' of
the state or international organisation—even if one accepted that an assessment
of the volitions of abstract collective entities were at all possible. In Anzilotti's
theory of international responsibility of 1902, attribution of conduct is described
as the result of legal criteria, not sociological or psychological inquiries.94 It was,
as he put it, `a pure result of the law'.95 Crucially, for Anzilotti, negligence, culpa, or
intentions of the human beings acting on behalf of the statewerewholly irrelevant
to the attribution of conduct to a state or an international organisation.96
This quintessentially positivist position was only one of the premises elab-
orated upon by Roberto Ago when he became the Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility at the International Law Commission.97 His first draft of the Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility contained 11 separate provisions devoted to the at-
tribution of conduct to states. These provisions were simplified and shortened
in the final 2001 version of the Articles,98 which maintained, in substance, Ago's
approach.99 Even a cursory reading of Ago's reports is sufficient to realise that
his approach was not exclusively `Italian' in any meaningful sense: the history of
international responsibility may well have started with Anzilotti, but other influ-
ences were fundamental in Ago's construction.100 This means that what could
possibly be considered the most enduring Italian contribution to the codifica-
tion of public international law—rules on attribution of internationally wrong-
94
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ful conduct—was not the product of some Italian distinctiveness, but rather of
Anzilotti's successful internationalisation of the Italian school.
3.4 The unintended consequences of legal positivism
3.4.1 The measure of Anzilotti's success
The example of attribution of conduct should have clarified that Anzilotti's suc-
cess in founding the Italian school of international law rendered it relatively in-
distinguishable from other European counterparts. By discarding Mancini's na-
tional school and Fiore's natural law, Anzilotti transited Italian international legal
scholarship into the mainstream of European legal thinking. This achievement
was so profound that one may wonder whether it did not in fact have certain
costs. At least two aspects should be considered: first, a form of indirect compla-
cency with the Fascist Regime; and second, a certain lack of intellectual diversity
within the Italian school, at least for the first part of the 20th century. Both are
rooted in an understanding of law and the legal method as `neutral science'.
3.4.2 The complex relationship with Fascism
We have seen that Sereni's main aim in 1943 was to show that Fascism had had
no impact on international legal scholarship in Italy. He devotes a whole chapter
to disproving the existence of a fascist conception of international law,101 and
clearly states in the preface that the book `also has a political purpose', which is
`to show that a deeply rooted love for justice and freedom pervades the writings
of all the greatest international lawyers of Italy' and that `a silent but efficient
resistance against fascist influence … has been maintained by most of the Italian
scholars'.102 These words were written while the Second World War was still
ongoing, and they come from an Italian who had to take refuge in the United
States because of the racial laws introduced by the Italian regime. They must
therefore be understood in their context, and with unbounded respect for their
author. However, they also must be qualified. First, none of the Italian professors
of international law refused to pledge allegiance to Mussolini's regime in 1931,
when this was made a requirement for holding an academic position.103 Second,
although the production of prominent Italian international lawyers was never
couched in terms of adherence to a fascist international legal doctrine (which
101
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indeed never emerged as such in Italy), the actual record of the legal positions
advanced by scholars at the time is rather problematic, even if it was couched in
terms of formally positivist legal positions.104 In other words, it is possible to
identify, from the mid-1930s onwards, `a benevolent approach towards positions
maintained by fascism',105 for example in relation to the war against Ethiopia
(notably by Santi Romano and even by Sereni himself).106
While Anzilotti's positivist method somewhat shielded Italian international
lawyers from the pressure of coming up with a fascist doctrine of international
law, and allowed them to confidently retreat into very abstract questions,107 it also
allowed politically unsavoury positions to be adopted with an aura of neutrality
towards the regime. As had been the case before Fascism,108 when the patria
called, legal arguments were clearly tailored to fit the position of the government
and to defend Italy. In Bartolini's persuasive view, `the screen apparently provided
by positivism in analysing legal issues can hardly be said to be totally impermeable
to political assessment'.109 Indeed, critical legal scholars would argue that such
impermeability simply could not exist.
3.4.3 The missing branches: Catholic and Marxist conceptions
Another critiquewhichmay be levied at the solid positivist foundations laid down
by Anzilotti is that they could only support a limited set of architectural choices.
By enlisting Italian international law to the European mainstream, many possible
competing narratives were lost, two of which will be considered here.
The first, and perhaps most obvious, concerns the influence of the Roman
Catholic Church in international law. Catholicism was one of the dominant cul-
tural forces in 20th Italy, yet its conception of international law remained mostly
outside the mainstream of scholarly production. We have seen that Gabriele
Salvioli was an exception,110 but there were not many others. The writings of An-
104
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tonio Messineo (1897-1978), a Jesuit intellectual working at the influential maga-
zine La Civiltà Cattolica, remained an isolated attempt at expounding a Catholic
doctrine of international law.111 Andwhile it is true that the official position of the
Holy See is that natural law should be at the heart of the world's juridical order,
even in the 21st century,112 this position is definitely not shared by the majority of
Italian scholars.
The fact that no Catholic doctrine of international law emerged from within
the Italian school can perhaps be explained historically. Italian international
law was born as a proudly secular enterprise. Mancini's position against the
temporal power of the pope and his fervent anti-clerical speeches in Parliament113
were quite standard for a Risorgimento man: after all, Italy's unification project
involved the invasion of the Papal States and the conquest of Rome. Anzilotti's
later endeavours were explicitly directed at eradicating natural law, the Church's
standard doctrine in matters of international law. What is more startling,
however, is that the unfettered cultural presence of the Church throughout 20th
century Italy did not inspire a reconsideration of natural law principles within the
Italian school of international law as one of the possible exit strategies from strict
positivism—not even in a secularised form separated from the `revealed truth'
of religion. In other words, it is somewhat surprising that Italy did not produce
its own equivalent of an international legal theorist such as Philip Allot,114 nor a
humanist conception such as that of Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.115
It is equally startling that, despite the great cultural influence of the Italian
Communist Party throughout the 20th century, the Italian conception of interna-
tional law was almost completely impermeable thereto.116 This may have to do
with the Italian Communist Party's `orthodox' Marxist approach. For the Party,
international law was simply a bourgeois instrument of oppression benefiting the
111
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`imperialist warmonger side' of the Cold War.117 Yet, some international lawyers
joined the Party, including Mario Giuliano (1914-1988), a very prominent mem-
ber of Roberto Ago's school.118 But just as was the case with Ian Brownlie, who
was a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain until 1968,119 this did
not translate into an abandonment of the positivist method. Cassese explicitly
laments that Giuliano's scholarly production ends up following `the most tradi-
tional style of the Italian school' except for some conclusions concerning inter-
national law as superstructure.120 Of course, there were some exceptions in more
recent times, such as Aldo Bernardini (b. 1935), whose conception of international
law is explicitly critical of `bourgeois' positivism.121 But, overall, in the country of
Antonio Gramsci, legal positivism was so hegemonic that no counter-hegemony
even came close to emerging amongst international lawyers.122 This is in stark
contrast with persisting Marxist legacies in other international legal circles,123 as
well as in Italian culture more generally.
3.5 The more recent heresies of pragmatic utopians
The rather sobering conclusion reached so far is that the successful creation of
an Italian school of international law led to its loss of distinctiveness compared
to Mancini's `theory of nationalities'. The more Anzilotti's project became
successful, the more Italians were effectively joining the European mainstream
of legal positivism—what we may call `black letter law'—as the legal method of
choice. Given the well-known hierarchical structure of Italian academia, it is
not surprising that little space was left for outsiders. But a word of caution
is needed. The broad strokes I have painted above do not take into account
the most recent developments in Italian scholarship in international law. There
appears to bemore interest towards theoretical, historical and critical approaches
to the discipline today than ever before. These `heresies' from Anzilottian rigour
117
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are part of the rising theoretical movement in international law more generally.
Once again, Italian international lawyers are gregarious members of the `Invisible
College', and this College is finally becoming more diverse.
Some would argue that these developments have long been brewing. A
certain departure from strict positivism had already been noticed by Antonio
Cassese (1937-2011) in a short historical note published in 1990.124 From the
1960s onwards, he argued, the `monolithic' methods of Italian international
law began to `crumble'.125 New trends emerged within positivism, such as
the `decline of formalism' in favour of a renewed attention to practical and
contemporary problems;126 a slightly more open mind towards normative, rather
than descriptive, projects, with renewed attention to the practice of states;127
and an interest towards the history of the discipline.128 In Cassese's view, all of
these elements led to amuchmore varied landscape, in which prominent scholars
such as Benedetto Conforti (b. 1930) and Luigi Condorelli (b. 1938) emerged as
enlightened (or critical) positivists, well versed with the reality of the application
of legal norms in domestic legal orders.129 The roots of this change were indeed
already contained in the above-mentioned `realist' outlook of Rolando Quadri
and Paolo Picone. But it is not unfair to note that these scholars were all fully
committed to `legal methodology' and a `strict distinction between de lege lata
enquiries and de lege ferenda proposals'.130
Because of these developments, things have certainly changed in Italian legal
scholarship since Anzilotti.131 In fact, Cassese himself was one of the most
prominent international lawyers of his time, and he came to embody a certain
mode of thinking about international law, as far removed from strict positivism
as it was possible to be while still `playing the game', i.e. remaining inside
the linguistic parameters of positive international law. In a rather self-effacing
account of his career written three years before his death, he described his
academic beginnings as those of a torn young scholar forcing himself to be `a
strict legalist' despite his real `desires and tendencies'.132 He soon became aware
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that while positivism had the advantage of clarifying the distinction between
law and history or politics, therefore enabling lawyers to `keep politics at bay',
such a distinction could lead to inadvertent subservience towards power, as had
happened during Fascism.133 Furthermore, positivism constituted a `powerful
shield of state sovereignty'.134 In his view, it was necessary to move beyond
the strict parameters agreed upon by States when `the need to oppose glaring
injustice' exceptionally required one to do so.135 Law was not to be a world of
abstract Platonic ideas, and lawyers should engage in a `strict and rigorous legal
method' to understand legal institutions and in a more general analysis of the
`political, social or economic motivations' leading to those institutions, never
shying away from suggesting how the law should be changed.136
The last collection of essays Cassese edited, published posthumously and
appropriately named Realizing Utopia, opened with his remarks on international
law's need for `judicious reformers', a label he borrowed from Aldous Huxley to
identify those who are neither utopians, nor disillusioned technicians.137 And
yet, the positive method was never completely abandoned by Italian international
lawyers, not even by Cassese. Some would argue that his constant analysis of
the lex lata from the point of view of what the law ought to be occasionally led
to a form of wishful legal thinking—not unlike previous idealist-but-positivist
international lawyers such as Hersch Lauterpacht. But Cassese's utopias, like
Lauterpacht's, were always quite pragmatic: the revolution was to be dressed in
the same language states had chosen to bind themselves to, otherwise it would
never become effective.
4 The flaws of a comparative approach to
international law
There is nothing especially `Italian' about this tension between the many possible
shades of black letter law, from pitch dark to dark grey: this is the same debate
international lawyers have had throughout the 20th century and beyond. But this
lack of distinctiveness of the Italian school is not worrisome in itself. The most
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radical criticism that could be levied to Sereni's book of 1943 is that there is no
particular need for an Italian conception of international law. Of course, analysing
whether different legal traditions can influence our perception of international
legal problems may be interesting, precisely in order to avoid parochialism.
Focarelli argues that `international law should be remythologized by inves-
tigating all the legal traditions known in comparative legal analysis, rather than
on (Western) jurisprudential grounds, and its reality in the sphere of communi-
cation'.138 Indeed, a comparative approach serves to protect the diversity of in-
ternational legal cultures, as Judge Yusuf argues elsewhere in this issue. This is a
rather different project from that of defending the national pride of a community
of scholars, as Sereni arguably set out to do. But is an emphasis on this `compar-
ative' perspective fruitful? Paradoxically, one of the key insights of `comparative
international law' seems to be that engaging in `comparative international law'
may not always be a good idea. National schools may well exist, but talking in
these terms invariably risks silencing dissenting voices and reinforcing the schol-
arly positions of the majority. This is especially true in a Continental European
context, where disproportionate respect towards the academic authority of old
and current masters often asphyxiates the creation of new ideas.139 In contrast,
in those contexts where originality is more emphasised (at times overzealously
so), the very process of identifying a `legal tradition' may well become impossible:
For instance, it has always been exceedingly difficult to say whether
America has a national tradition in international law. To illus-
trate, who in the American legal academy could summarize themain
tenets of the American approach to international law? Even assum-
ing such a brave step were taken, for every such enunciation by,
say, Anne-Marie Slaughter or W. Michael Reisman, one could point
to a countervailing summation by, say, Jack Goldsmith or David
Kennedy. The point is, within the American society of international
law scholars, there are a sufficient number of diametrically opposed
positions that it becomes impossible to brand one position domi-
nant or orthodox.140
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In fact, there are possibly asmany Italian conceptions of international law as there
are scholars with Italian passports, in Italy and abroad. While there is no uniquely
Italian conception of international law, there certainly is an Italian school in
the broadest sense: that is the community of practice of those 268 academics
and their Italian colleagues abroad, who in large part (but no longer exclusively)
follow the European mainstream of norm-oriented, or positivist, international
law. Future studies of this community of practice would need to consider certain
sociological aspects which were not dealt with in Sereni's book of 1943, nor that
could be dealt with here. For instance, analysing the reciprocal influence of
academic international law and Italian diplomatic practice may shed some light
on whether Italian international lawyers have still sometimes been tempted to
cast a benevolent eye on legal positions helpful to Italian foreign policy, following
the example of Mancini's about-turn from self-determination to colonisation.
